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~bsrr~cr-Effective mitigation of denial of service (DoS) attack is a press- ronment due to speed and autonlation-where. at a minimum: 
ing problem on the Internet- In many instances, DoS attacks can be Pre- the occurrence of a potentially valid event (e.2.: service request, 
vented if the spoofed source IP  address is traced back to its origin which 
allows assigning penalties to the offending party o r  isolating the compro- TCP SYN packet) must be processed to ascertain its validity. 
mised hosts and domains from the rest of the network. Recently IP trace- Even though the resource expenditure associated with process- 
back mechanisms based on probabilistic packet marking (PPM) have been 
proposed for achieving traceback of DoS attacks. In this paper, we show 
that probabilistic packet marking-of interest due to its efficiency and im- 
plementability vis-a-vis deterministic packet marking and logging or  mes- 
saging based schemes-suffers under spoofing of the marking field in the IP 
header by the attacker which can impede traceback by the victim. We show 
that there is a trade-off between the ability of the victim to localize the at- 
tacker and the severity of tlle DoS attack. which is represented a s  a function 
of the marking probability, pat11 length, and traffic volume. The optimal de- 
cision problem-the victim-can clloose the marking probability whereas the 
attacker can choose the spoofed marking value, source address, and attack 
volume-can be expressed as a constrained miuimax optimization problem, 
where the victim chooses the marking probability such that the number of 
forgeable attack paths is minimized. We show that the attacker's ability to 
hide his location is curtailed by increasing the marking probability, ho\r3- 
ever, the latter is upper-bounded due to sampling constraints. In typical 
IF' internets, the attacker's address can be localized to within 2-5 equally 
likely sites which renders PPM effcctive against single source attacks. Un- 
der distributed DoS attacks, the uncertainty achievable by the attacker can 
be amplified, which diminishes the effectiveness of PPM. 
Key11:or-(Is- Probabilistic packet nlarking, Denial of service attack, 
Traceback analysis, Network security, I P  spoofing 
Denial of service (DoS) is a pressing problem on the Inter- 
net as evidenced by recent attacks on commercial servers and 
ISPs and their consequent disruption of services [2]. DoS at- 
tacks [3], [4], [ 5 ] ,  [611 [7], [8] consume resources associated 
with various network elements-e.g.: Web servers, routers, fire- 
walls: and end hosts-which impedes the efficient functioning 
and provisioning of services in accordance with their intended 
purpose. Their impact is more pronounced than network con- 
gestion due to the concentrated and targeted nature of resource 
depletion and clogging, which not only impacts quality of ser- 
vice (QoS) but can affect the very availability of services. Sus- 
ceptibility to DoS is an intrinsic probleln of any service provi- 
sioning systen1-albeit amplified in the networked digital envi- 
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ing a single event may be negligible, when this is multiplied 
by the large factors enabled by the high bandwidth of modern 
broadband networks; its impact can be significant no matter how 
small the individual processing overhead. Firewalls and filters 
running at gateway routers can shield a network system froin 
outside DoS flows, but if their function includes selectively ad- 
mitting valid client flows resident outside a guarded domain, 
then this very filtering service can be impeded by DoS attacks 
targeted at the gateway. As with prank telephone calls or ring- 
ing of door bells in days gone by, an effective means of pre- 
venting DoS attacks from occurrinp in the first dace-also the - - 
only fundamental solution given the intrinsic susceptibility of 
service provisioning systems to DoS-lies in identification of 
the attacker which admits assigning commensurate costs ( e . ~ . :  
legal or econonlical) to the perpetrating entity. Even if the at- 
tack was instituted from compro~nised hosts intruded by an at- 
tacker. if the physical source of DoS traffic can be identified, 
then at the very least the invaded network element can be iso- 
lated or shut down, and in some instances. the attacker's identity 
can be further traced back by state information available on the 
compromised system. In this paper, we address the source iden- 
tification problem and analyze its properties from a probabilis- 
tic packet marking approach, motivated by its appealing feature 
with respect to efficiency and implementability. 
B. A Cose.for- Plabobilisric Pocket Morkbag 
A "simple" way of identifying the physical source of DoS 
traffic is by elimination of IP address spoofing. If all ISPs 
were to in~plement niechanis~ns for preventing IP source address 
spoofing-which ist technically, easy to do-then source identi- 
fication (also called IP traceback in [9]). would be solved. A less 
drastic nieasure, based on packet marking, would allow spoofed 
packets to pass through, however, with the corrected source IP 
address overwriting the spoofed source IP address. For various 
practical reasons: this may be difficult to achieve or require a 
prolonped period to be broadly deployed on the Internet. Thus: 
there is a need for incrementally deployable techniques that may 
not conlpletely eliminate the DoS problem, but reduce it to a 
"manageable" level. 
A number of recent works have studied the problem of trac- 
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ing the physical source of a DoS attack [61, [9]: [lo]; [I I] .  [ l2],  
11 31, [I 41. In cierer7ni17istic packer rnnrkirlg [I 51, the source of 
a traffic flow is recovered by employing tracing information in- 
scribed in the packet. Packet marking can be viewed as a form 
of "stateless logging" which emulates the capability of path re- 
covery by router based information logging [l2], [14]: without 
incuning the latter's statefulness and associated space overhead. 
A related method is messaging based path recovery [I 01 which 
uses control messages emitted from routers conveying path in- 
formation to destination nodes. Thus (router) statelessness is 
achieved, however: at the cost of message overhead. Packet 
marking-and, to some extent, messaging-follows the end-to- 
end paradigm [ 161 where complexity of path recovery is pushed 
to the edge while imposing a minimal footprint on per-hop net- 
work support reqrlirenients. 
A significant drawback of deterministic packet marking 
(DPM) is the increasing packet header size requirement which 
grows linearly with hop count. In addition to amplifying packet 
size-a form of communication complexity4ynamically vari- 
able packet sizes con~plicate router processing which can impart 
nontrivial overhead to achieving terabit-per-second switching 
speeds. In probobilisric packer marking [9], each router prob- 
abilistically inscribes its local path information onto a travers- 
ing packet so that the destination node (i.e., victiin of an attack) 
can reconstruct, with high probability, the coniplete path tra- 
versed by inspecting the markings on the received packets, as- 
suming the attack volume is sufficiently high. This corresponds 
to probabilistically "sampling" the route undertaken by an at- 
tack using corlstnrzr space in the packet header independent of 
hop count: which provides the key advantage over deterministic 
packet marking. In probabilistic marking, when a router de- 
cides to mark based on a coin toss with marking probability p. it 
overwrites the information contained in the marking field: thus 
erasing any possible markings by upstream routers. Thus. for 
PPM to work, it is necessary that p < 1. By the same token. 
with some positive probability, a packet will arrive at the desti- 
nation  ith hour l~nvir~g beerz rnnrked by any of rhe irzrer-rnediore 
rorrrers. This reveals--above and beyond the need for requiring 
a set of packets to recover the attack path-a potentially serious 
weakness of PPM since the marking field may contain a value, 
inscribed by the attacker, whose aim is to confuse or impede the 
victim's ability to traceback. In this paper, we give a compre- 
hensive treatment of the spoofed rnarkingJield problem. 
C. New Corirriblrtiorzs 
We analyze the effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking 
for IP traceback under DoS attack. Our technical contributions 
are two-fold. 
First, we define the source identification probleni in the 
framework of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) and present 
a comprehensive analysis of its properties. We show that PPM 
is vulnerable to spoofing of the marking field in the IP header 
by the attacker which can impede traceback by the victim. We 
show that there is a trade-off relation between the ability of the 
victim to localize the attacker and the severity of the DoS at- 
tack, which is a function of the marking probability, path length, 
and traffic volume. The optimal decision problem-the victim 
can choose the marking probability and the attacker chooses the 
spoofed marking value, source address, and attack volunie- 
can be expressed as a constrained minimax optimization prob- 
lem: the victim selects the niarking probability such that the 
number of forgeable attack paths is minimized and the attacker 
chooses the traffic volume and marking value to maximize un- 
certainty. We show that the attacker's ability to hide his location 
is curtailed by increasing the marking probability, however. the 
degree to which the victim can delimit the attacker's injection 
of uncertainty is bounded by sampling constraints. In particu- 
lar, the attacker, by choosing a minimal attack traffic volume, 
can amplify the nuniber of equally likely forged attack paths to 
d- independent of the victim's choice of marking probability, 
where d is the path length. In IP internetworks with hop count 
25 or less (as is the case on the Internet) and attack volume in 
the thousands of packets-to qualify as a DoS attack, the vic- 
tim's resources must be nontrivially taxed-we show that the 
attacker's address can be localized to within 2-5 equally likely 
sites which renders PPM effective against single source attacks. 
Second, we analyze the consequences of the attacker mount- 
ing distributed DoS attacks where each partaking attack host 
transmits a minimal traffic volume to maximize anonymity, and 
attack volume amplification is achieved by engaging a large 
nuniber of sources. We show that for a given attack volume, by 
mounting a distributed denial of service attack, the uncertainty 
injected into IP traceback can be amplified above and beyond 
the effect afforded by distributedness. Thus PPM, while effec- 
tive against single-source attacks, is potentially vulnerable when 
subject to distributed DoS attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section: we give a summary of related works. In Section 111: 
we discuss the core issues surrounding source identification and 
define the IP traceback problem in the framework of PPM. In 
Section IV, we present the analysis of single-source DoS attack 
which is complemented by numerical evaluations using Internet 
related parameters. In Section V we study the distributed DoS 
case and show its detrimental consequences on PPM. We con- 
clude with a discussion of our results. 
Several types of DoS attacks have been identified [2], (41, [6]: 
[7] with the most basic DoS attack demanding more resources 
than the target system or network can supply. Resources may 
be network bandwidth, file system space, processes: or network 
connections (61. While host-based DoS attacks are more easily 
traced and managed, network-based DoS attacks which exploit 
weaknesses of the TCPIIP protocol suite [17], represent a more 
subtle and challenging threat [6]: [9]. Network-based DoS at- 
tacks, by default. employ spoofing to forge the source address 
of DoS packets to hide the identity of the physical source [8]. 
Previous works have focused on detecting DoS attacks and mit- 
igating their detrimental impact upon the victiin [ I  81, [19], [20]. 
[21]. This approach does not eliminate the problem, nor does 
it deter potential attackers. As a means of preventing network- 
based DoS attacks, edge filtering in border gateways has been 
proposed for limiting IP source address spoofing [22]. [23], 
[24]. The filtering rules can affect dropping of forged packets 
using egress filtering in user organizations and ingress filtering 
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in ISPs [2], [25]. 
A number of recent works have studied source identification 
(also called IP traceback in [9]) which span a range of tech- 
niques with their individual pros and cons. In link testing, the 
physical source of an attack is identified by tracing it back hop- 
by-hop through the network [I I]. Traceback is typically per- 
formed manually and recursively repeated at the upstream router 
until the originating host is reached. The drawbacks of link test- 
ing include multiple branch points, slow traceback during an 
attack, con~n~unication verhead due to message exchange, and 
administrative constraints between network operators including 
legal issues [I I]. The audit trail approach facilitates tracing via 
traffic logs at routers and gateways (121, [14], [26]. This method 
is conducive to off-line traceback of DoS attacks. A principal 
weakness, however? is the high storage and processing over- 
head incurred at routers-which are expected to switch at Tbps 
rates-which can exert a significant burden. In behavioral mon- 
itoring, the likely behavior of an attacker during a DoS attack is 
monitored to identify the source [6]. For example, an attacker 
may perform DNS requests to resolve the name of the target host 
which may not be resident in its local name server's cache. Dur- 
ing a DoS attack, an attacker may try to gauge the impact of the 
attack using various service requests including Web and ICMP 
echo requests. Thus, logging of such events and activities can 
reveal information about the attacker's source. In packet-based 
traceback, packets are marked with the addresses of intermedi- 
ate routers, in some sense, an inverse operation of source routing 
and similar to the IP Record Route option (271. The victim uses 
information inscribed in packets to trace the attack back to its 
source. A related method is generating information packets- 
separate from data packets-that convey analogous path infor- 
ination as ICMP traceback messages to the victim [lo]. In both 
methods, overhead in the form of variable-length marking fields 
that depend on path length or traffic overhead due to extra mes- 
saging packets are incurred. 
Fig. 11.1. In PPM.an attacker can forge a path that is equally likely as Ihe true at- 
tack path by transmitting corrupted packets that reach the victim untouched 
(i.e.. unmarked). 
Probabilistic packet marking [9], [13], [I51 achieves the best 
of both worlds-space efficiency in the form of constant mark- 
ing field and processing efficiei~cy in the form of minimal router 
support-at the expense of introducing uncertainty due to prob- 
abilistic sampling of a flow's path. The latter has two important, 
and opposing. effects: (a) discovery of correct path information 
by sampling which aids the victinl's objective of traceback, and 
(b) injection of corrupted information by the attacker. In the 
latter, with a certain probability a packet-however formatted 
by the attacker-will travel through i~ntouched. which can im- 
pede the victim's ability to identify the true attack path. This is 
illustrated in Figure 11.1. More generally, the number of forge- 
able paths that are from an information-theoretic point-of-view 
indistinguishable with respect to their validity from the true at- 
tack path can further render source identification difficult if their 
numbers are large. In [9]: issue (a) was analyzed yielding a par- 
tial and, perhaps, overly optimistic evaluation of probabilistic 
packet marking as a DoS prevention method. The principal con- 
tribution of [9] lies in the investigation of coding issues aimed 
at further reducing the (constant) rnarking bits needed in the IP 
header via fragmentation. The IP option field is another pos- 
sible candidate for implementing marking field coding. In this 
paper, we study the critical issue (b)-the attacker's ability to 
inject misleading information-and give a comprehensive anal- 
ysis of the effectiveness of PPM under single-source and dis- 
tributed DoS attacks, complemented by nun~erical evaluations. 
We remark that PPM is not perfect and suffers under two ad- 
ditional weaknesses (they are not unique to PPM, however, and 
are shared by the other approaches). First. PPM is reactive in 
the sense that damage must occur before corrective actions- 
including source identification-can be undertaken by the vic- 
tim. Second: PPM does not scale well i~nder  distributed DoS 
(DDoS) attacks in the sense that the more hosts an attacker 
is able to compromise and use as a distributed attack site, the 
greater the effort needed (approximately proportional) to iden- 
tify the attack sites. Route-based distributed packet filtering [28] 
is a new approach which, in addition to matching the power of 
PPM: solves its weaknesses including the need to have a mark- 
ing field. 
111. PROBABILISTIC PACKET M A R K I N G  A N D  TRACEBACK 
A. Network Model 
The network is given as a directed graph G = (I.;.. E) where 
1.' is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. 1.. can be further 
partitioned into end systems (leaf nodes) and routers (internal 
nodes). The edges denote physical links between elements in 
1,'. Let S C I,' denote the set of attackers and let t E V \ S 
denote the victirn. We will first consider the case when IS1 = 1 
(single-source attack) and treat the distributed DoS attack case 
separately. We assume that routes are fixed', and 
comprised of (1 routers (or hops) vl . . . . . u d :  and of path length2 
d is called an attack pa t l~ .  A path U: U # A: with destination 
node t and source node u (u # s )  is called a.for-genble path. 
B. 1 Definition 
Let -h: denote the number of packets sent froin s to t .  We will 
leave the time duration or interval unspecified (typically -hi >> 
1 and DoS attacks occur over a concentrated time period). A 
'011 tlle IP Internet. the majorily of TCP sessions do not experience route 
changes during their connection lifelime. Generalization of PPM under dynamic 
routin: (Ihr routing pl-ocess must be specified) is a problem for future work. 
'Without lossof generality. ule use a sliphtly niodifird delinition of path length 
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Fig. 111.1. Left: ao(p)/01(p) as a function ol'p Risht: ao(p)/ C7 a,(p) as a function o f p  for d = 10. '25 
packet s is assumed to have a mcrrkingjeld where the identity 
of a link (v! v') E E traversed can be inscribed. A packet travels 
on the attack path A sequentially. At a hop vi E { v l : .  . . : vd), 
packets  is marked with the edge value (vi- l ,  v,), i = 1.. . . . d, 
with probability p (0 < p < 1) where vo = s .  This process is 
called probnbilistic ~nc~rking. If a packet s was already marked 
by a previous router: a new mark will replace or overwrite the 
old one. Let x j :  j = 0 , 1 ,  . . . ! d denote the value of the marking 
field at node vi. Let XI! XS:. . . . X d  be a set of i.i.d. binary 
random variables where Pr{Xi = 1) = p, P r { S i  = 0) = 
1 -p,  and X i  = 1 indicates that marlung was performed at node 
vi. .zto is under the control of the attacker who determines the 
initial marking value. Thus .ztj is a random variable depending 
on Sj, X j - l . .  . . .XI  and :ro, and we will be interested in the 
behavior of xd. 
B.2 Path Sampling 
coupon collector's problem using the relaxed probability a (p); 
which yields the well-known solution t l ln  d + O(d). This has 
also been noted in (91. 
B.3 Marking Field Spoofing 
When A; packets are sent in the course of a DoS attack. the 
attacker can expect no(p)  = .A:(1 - p)"ackets containing the 
attacker's inscribed value TO to reach the target untouched. By 
"corrupting" the marking field-in addition to spoofing the IP 
source address-the attacker may adversely impact the path re- 
construction capability of the victim based on the A' packets re- 
ceived. The larger the fraction of corrupted marking field pack- 
ets, the more damage the attacker can exact. What values to 
inscribe to aghieve maxinium effect is treated in the next sec- 
tion. With respect to the weakest point v l :  we are interested in 
the p vaIues for which 
Let ai (p) denote the probability that the arriving packet at the no (P) > nl (P) * NO (P) 1 01 (12)  
victim is lastly marked at node vi but nowhere after vi.  Thus (111.1) * (1  - p)" p (1  - p)d-' 
The probability that a packet sent from the attacker reaches the 
victim without being marked at any of the routers is a o ( p )  = 
(1  - p)d. As with IP source address spoofing, the attacker may 
choose to inscribe a value zo  which serves the purpose of hid- 
ing the attacker's identity. When A; packets are transmitted, the 
expected number of packets reaching target t marked with the 
edge value (vi- 1 , vi) is ni  (p) = N a ,  (p).  Note that 
and to receive a marked packet from v l  containing the first link 
value (s! v l )  requires -A: >_ l/al (p). Since A; (the attack vol- 
ume) is a variable under the attacker's control: from a purely 
sampling point-of-view, edge ( s , v l )  is the "weakest link" re- 
quiring the most san~ples (i.e.: packet transmissions) to recover 
the attack path. The expected number of sanlples needed to re- 
ceive marked packets from all routers requires a logarithmic cor- 
rection term, and is bounded above by (const. I11 d ) / a  1 (p).  This 
folIows from the disjointness of a i ( p )  and an application of the 
which has the solutionp < 112. That is: i f p  5 112 then spoofed 
packets will arrive more than true packets marked with the link 
value (s :  v l ) .  In general, we may consider the case 
where the corrupted packets are in the absolute majority which 
holds for p < 1 - 2-'Id. For example, for d = 10: the in- 
equality holds if p < 0.067. Figure 111.1 (left) shows the ratio 
a o ( p ) / a l  (p) as a function of p,  and Figure 111.1 (right) shows 
a o ( p ) /  xi a i ( p )  as a function of y for d = 10.25. 
Whereas A;, d, and s o  are under the attacker's control, the 
marking probability is a system parameter and: thus, the purview 
of the victim. The optimal selection of IV: d, and so by the at- 
tacker. and correspondingIy optimal selection of p by the vic- 
tim to achieve their individual, conflicting objectives lies at the 
heart of the probabilistic PPM approach to source identification. 
In practice, we assume that an overall agreed-upon: effective p 
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of the attacker is to maximize 112: whereas the objective of the 
victim is to minimize nz. A minimax optin~ization problem for 
the attacker and victim can be formulated as follows: 
- atrack path 
- - - ~ ~ ~  - forgeable path: 
Fig. 111.2. Attack path (s: ui: un.. . . .z:,,: l)  and a scl of nz forgeable paths 
(u,. ul:. . . : c d :  1 ) .  i = 1 . .  . . . n l .  joined ar vl 
C. Traceback Problein 
Consider an attacker with attack path A = (s. z. I .  . . . , vd. t)  
and forgeable paths = (ui. ?:I.. . . . tld. t). i = 1.. . . . m ,  at 
distanced, joined at vl  forming the (caterpillar) subgraph shown 
in Figure 111.2. This particular attack pattern is of interest (i) 
because it targets the "weakest" point of probable path recov- 
ery by the victim according to (111.1). (ii) attacker s can gen- 
erate packets that, unless marked at 1 : ' ;  will be indistinguish- 
able from real packets originating at u and arriving at t :  (iii) 
other attack configurations can be analyzed using the tools de- 
veloped for the caterpillar subgraph, and (iv) the concepts un- 
derlying optimal decision making by both attacker and victim 
are easily brought out. The traceback problem in a caterpil- 
lar graph is a special case of the traceback problem in gen- 
eral topologies, which is discussed in the full paper [ I ] .  One 
of the three decision variables-the attacker's marking field 
spoof variable .TO--can be fixed by the following information- 
theoretic argument. Let izg(p) be the number of spoofed pack- 
ets arriving at t with the marking field containing ( u i ,  V I ) .  AS- 
sume izo(p) = Cyil nf(p) .  That isl all packets transmitted by 
the attacker are inscribed with spoofing values from the link set 
{ ( u , ~ !  vl) : i = 1: 2 , .  . . .nz). If it holds that 
then by (ii) all nz t 1 paths are e q ~ ~ a l l j  1ikelyi .e . .  the 
attack could have been undertaken from any of the nodes 
s !  u , ~ :  u?!. . . . u,,, yielding the same outcome in terms of col- 
lected marking values at t .  Of course, by the probabilistic na- 
ture of the marking process, exact equality cannot be expected 
to hold. Instead, if the marginal densities can be equated 
entropy is maximal, and by symmetry, each of the nodes 
{s. u l .  7 1 2 , .  . . , u,,,) is an equally likely candidate. We will call 
m-a function of p and spoofing variable zo-the ~rncertaing. 
fnctor with respect to marking probability p.  For a formal def- 
inition of the "indistinguishability notion." we refer the reader 
to [I].  In the context of traceback. the uncertainty factor ~ i z  is
the objective function for measuring the effectiveness of trace- 
back. The larger nz is. the more the processing cost incurred by 
the victim to trace back the attack source. Thus. the objective 
lnin ma.x m ( p .  .TO)  
P :co (111.5) 
subject to (111.4) 
where the maximum is over all distributions of r o  viewed as a 
random variable. The minimax formulation biases toward the 
victim. The formulation in (111.5) does not incorporate the at- 
tack volume -&: and thus unduly favors the victim. A sampling 
constraint is added by requiring 
-&;a, (p) = I\ip(l - p)d-' > 1. (111.6) 
Tliirs the refined minimax optimization reflecting the victim's 
sampling constraint is given by 
min inax m ( p .  xo) 
p r0:N (111.7) 
subject to (111.4) and (111.6). 
Note that -Y is incorporated as part of the attacker's decision 
variable due to constraint (111.6). fial (p) as a function of p 
has a unimodal (or bell) shape with peak at p = l l d .  Thus 
decreasing A; can shrink the size of the feasible region defined 
by (111.6). 
IV. ANALYSIS O F  SINGLE-SOURCE DoS ATTACK 
This section analyzes PPM under single-source DoS attacks. 
We first derive performance bounds for the minimax optimiza- 
tion problem, and then give numerical evaluations using Internet 
related parameters that complement the analytical results. 
A necessary condition for (111.4) to hold is that when trans- 
mitting a packet, the attacker inscribes spoofed link values with 
unifonn probability, i.e., 
1 
P 1 . { ~ o = ( u 2 , v 1 ) ) = - ,  m i = 1 . 2  . . . . :  nz. (IV.1) 
Condition (IV.1) can be further derandomized-i.e., re- 
placed by a deterministic procedure that emulates uniform 
generation-if information contained in the sequential arrival of 
marked/spoofed packets is not considered. In conjunction with 
(IV. I), a necessary and sufficient condition for (111.4) is 
That is? given p (determined by the victim), the attacker can 
achieve an uncertainty factor of m = ( l l p )  - 1. Thus i n  = 
( l l p )  - 1 is the inax-bml uncertainty factor satisfying (111.4) for 
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since O < p  < 1. Since p  = 1  is disallo~~ed-necessary for 
probabilistic path discovery when the hop count d  is at least 2- 
we have 
'The uncertainty factor achievable by the attacker becomes null 
since, m being an integer representing the in-degree of router 
v l :  0111~ Lm] matters. With the sampling constraint (111.6) con- 
straining the victim from choosing p  arbitrarily close to I, we 
need to compute the min-max over the feasible region 
defined by (111.6) where L is parameterized by the attack dis- 
tance d.  It can be checked that for all d > 2, L is convex in p. 
Thus the feasible region L defined by both the attacker and vic- 
tim's moves is a union of convex sets L.4; (the set L keeping the 
second coordinate fixed at .A:) for .A; 2 .KO where K O  = .ATo ( d )  
is the least number-a function of d-such that (p !  N o )  E L for 
some p. 
Tlzeorern I: For all d  > 2. Ln; is convex. Furthermore, 
L.vf > L.4, i f K 1  2 K .  
Theorem I shows that the minimax problem can be viewed as 
a sequence of convex minimization problems of the objective 
function (lip) - 1  over L.4; for -A; = K O ,  N o  + 1 , .  . . . Thus 
there is a unique solution. The next result gives a performance 
bound on the attacker's ability to hide his identity under PPM. 
Theorern 2: Let m.' be the solution of the constrained mini- 
max problem given by (111.7). Then m ' < d  - 1. 
Theorem 2  shows that the maximum achievable ~~ncertainty 
factor-i.e., equally likely forged paths-cannot exceed d  - 1: 
the distance between the attacker and victim. Thus the farther 
the attack site froin the target, the more uncertainty can be in- 
jected. On the Internet [29]:  most path lengths are bounded by 
25. and thus this puts an upper bound on the effectiveness of 
single-source DoS attacks when subject to probabilistic packet 
marking. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2  is the fol- 
lowing corollary which shows that d  - 1  can be tight. 
Corolla~y I: If A; = d"(d - 1)"-' then m' = d  - 1. 
Thus the attacker, by judiciously choosing the attack volume. 
can maximally hide his identity given by d  - 1. Since d"(d - 
1)"' cx d,  this occurs at a drastic cost in reduced attack volun~e 
which inay fail to affect significant "denial of service" at the 
target. thus taking the bite out of the attack. 
B. Approximation of Uricertainty Fcrctor 
To find a feasible region of p  for K p ( 1  - p ) d - l  > 1, we 
need to solve the equation IVp(1 - p)"-' = 1. This equation 
is transformed to the polynomial z n  - z7'-' + c  by substitution 
of p. -W. d  with 1  - 2,  l / c ,  n, respectively. It is not possible. 
however. to factor the polynomial with c  = l / A ;  to find its roots. 
Also. there are no known formulae for the roots of polynomials 
with degree n > 5 [30].  Therefore, we derive approximate so- 
lutions for the minimax optimization problem in addition to the 
qualitative results derived in the previous section. 
Without loss of generality, we divide .Aip(l - p)"-' = 1  by 
.W. and represent p  as 1  - z ( 0  < z < 1) .  Thus, the equation 
becomes 
1  
( 1  - z)zd- '  = - n; ' 
Assuming f i  >> 1  which is justified by il: denoting the attack 
volun~e of DoS, the right-hand-side becomes & z 0. Thus, the 
solution is close to 0 or 1 .  First, consider the case where a root 
is close to 1. The exponential term will be close to 1, yielding 
the approximate solution z = 1  - l / f i .  For this value of z: the 
exponential term on the left-hand-side becomes ( 1  - 1 / M )  d - ' .  
This term approaches 1 as K  + co. For example, its value is 
0.99976 when N = lo5 and d = 25. which is small compared 
to unity. Thus, we arrive at an approximation to the root. 
Next. consider the case when the root is close to 0. The term 
( 1  - r )  will be close to I, and may be neglected. The equation 
r"' = 1 / N  gives an approximate solution r = $ &. The 
1 
value of r = & d-l is close to O for large :Y so that ( 1  - m) = 1. 
Thus, since z  is approximately 1  - ( l / -A;)  or zi : the corre- 
I 
sponding p  is l / A ;  or 1  - =. Therefore, p  is approximately 
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Fig. IV.2. Left: Upper bound of marking probability p and its appl.oximalion as a lunction of d for .h7 = ld: lo5:  10'. Right: Upper bound of p as a function of 
.hi (i.e.. its logaritli~ll) fol- d = 5: 10: 15: 20. and 25. 
Hence. the maximum uncertainty value 712 of the min-max opti- 
mization problem is given by 
When .A; = 10h11d d = 25, the uncertainty factor m is ap- 
proximated by 1.6247. When -W = lo7 and d = 25: m is further 
reduced to 1.0446. From the approximate analysis of the max- 
imaIly attainable uncertainty factor: we conclude that choosing 
a maximum allowable p by a victim results in the limited abil- 
ity of an attacker to hide his identity (e.g., 7 n  = 1 - 2 when 
n; = lo5  - 107). 
C. Numerical Eval~ratiorz 
In this section, we give numerical solutions to (111.7) that 
complen~ent he bounding results and the approximate solutions 
given in the previous sections. 
C. 1 Marking Probability 
Probabilistic marking with respect to its encoding using the IP 
header's fragmentation field can be efficiently implemented us- 
ing code distribution over multiple packets. We refer the reader 
to [9] for a discussion. 
First we measure the range of p which satisfies nl  ( p )  2 1 for 
different values of -A' and d .  Figure IV. I (left) shows n I ( p )  = 
p(1 - p)d-lfi as a function of p for IV = 26,100, and 200 
when d = 10. The allowable range of p (i.e., the set Lni) is the 
region where values of nl (p) become larger than 1. This can be 
discerned by the intersection of nl ( p )  with the constant line I .  
For this graph: the upper bound of p is minimized at l l d  = 0.1 
with M = 1010/99 z 26. As IV decreases, the upper bound of p 
decreases until X reaches to d"(d - I ) " - ' .  Figure 1V.I (right) 
shows the corresponding graphs when d = 25. 
Figure IV.2 (left) shows the feasible range of p as a function 
of d when A: = lo3 .  lo5.  l o 7 ,  and their approximations. The 
plots show that our approxin~ation is close to the solution. In 
particular, as K increases. the approximation becomes tighter, 
especially, for d large. The upper graphs represent the upper 
bounds o f p  which correspond to the minimax solution of (III.7)? 
and the bottom graphs are of the feasible region L,v which are 
near zero. We observe that as d increases, the upper bound of 
p decreases. Since the Internet has a bounded diameter, the 
upper bound of p stays at "high" values yielding uncertainty 
factors m = ( l l p )  - 1 that are commensurately "low." Fig- 
ure IV.2 (right) shows the minimax solution as a function of 
traffic volume A; (i.e., its logarithm log N) for N in the range 
100 N lo7 when d = 5: 10. 15. 20: and 25. We observe that to 
reduce the minimax value of p and thus increase the uncertainty 
factor m, the attack volume needs to be decreased exponentially 
which is a high penalty to pay in a DoS attack. 
C.2 Attack Distance 
Let us consider the range of forgeable paths when d = 25, 
since few paths on the Internet exceed that distance [29]. In the 
case of N = l o 5 ,  the marking probability p must be in the range 
0.1 x 10-" p < 0.3536 to satisfy the sampling constraint. For 
this range, the number of forgeable paths m is shown in Fig- 
ure IV.3 (left). While the uncertainty factor m lies in the range 
1 < m < lo5: a victim can reduce m to 2 by choosing the max- 
imal feasible p, i.e., p = 0.35. When we increase -W to l o 7 ,  p  is 
in the range of 0.1 x < p < 0.4729, and its correspond- 
ing value of m is shown in Figure IV.3 (left). From the above 
instances, we observe that even though PPM cannot pinpoint 
the attack host's location, the number of possible candidates is a 
manageable constant which can help facilitate on-line traceback 
and increase the deterrent factor. 
Let LIS consider the effect of the attacker's location to the 
traceback. As shown in Figure IV.2: as d increases, the up- 
per bound of p decreases. which increases the uncertainty factor 
In. Given K, as distance d decreases, the expected number of 
spoofed packets, -A:, will increase for any given value of p. We 
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Fig. IV.3. Left: The lower bound of forfeablr: pailis m as a ft~nction of p ford = 
s amp l in  constraint (111.6). 
location is not in proportion to the number of spoofed packets 
received by the victim. Conversely. as d increases, while the 
number of spoofed packets received by a victim decreases, the 
uncertainty factor m increases, Therefore. when the source of an 
attack is far from the victim, the attacker becomes more potent 
at impeding traceback. Since the distance between an attacker 
and victim is bounded on the Internet. an attacker has limited 
ability to hide his location when subject to probabilistic packet 
marking. 
C.3 Attack Volume 
For the purpose of path reconstrtlction on the victim side. 
needs to be at least d d / ( d  - l )d- '  to satisfy the sampling con- 
straint. Figure IV.3 (right) shows the sampling lower bound on 
.R; when d = 2 - 30. AS -V increases. the victim can reduce 
the number of forgeable paths to less than d - 1. Therefore. if 
an attacker transmits a small number of packets near the sam- 
pling lower bound. the victim will additionally suffer under a 
sampling problem. This points toward the fact that amplified 
confusion can be achieved by lnountlng distributed DoS attacks 
where each attack host contributes a small fraction of the total 
attack volume. 
Fig. IV.1. The minimax solution of forgeable paths m as a function of N (shown 
for log N) and d. 
(I 1 1 1  I S  lil :s !I! 
I 
25 and .\: = 105. lo7 .  Risht: The least attack volume 3' needed 10 satisfy the 
Figure IV.4 shows the minimax solution of uncertainty factor 
7 1 1  as a joint function of d and log!V. The value of 7n, is plotted 
for 10' 5 iY 5 lo7 and 2 5 d 5 30. As noted earlier: all 
increase in d leads to an increase in 772. Whereas the impact of 
d is gradual-in fact: linear (i.e.. upper bounded by d - 1): the 
impact of !Y is more pronounced. With a small attack volume. 
e.g., i\,- = 10 - 100: an attacker can keep the victim at an 
uncertainty level approaching 20. As N increases to -v = l o 3  - 
lo5: however. i-rz can achieve values only in the range 1 - 4 even 
at d = 25. This means that a victim can effectively localize the 
physical source of an attack to 2 - 5 candidates. This makes 
it intrinsically difficult for a DoS attacker to wreck havoc using 
single-source attacks when PPM is employed by the network to 
facilitate traceback. Of course, it is unrealistic to assume that 
p can be programmed by different users to suit their individual 
needs. The small constant upper bound on Tn admits the policy 
of setting w n c e  and for all-for a sufficiently large distance d 
and conservative attack volume A; which renders single-source 
traceback practically feasible. 
V.  D ~ S T R ~ B U T E D  DoS ATTACK 
A. Kej' Issues 
Given the theoretically and practically bounded impact of 
single-source DoS attack under probabilistic packet marking, 
distributed DoS attacks present a potentially important dimen- 
sion to the source identification problem. In Section IV we 
showed that the uncertainty factor in single-source attack can 
be amplified up to 20 if the path length is sufficiently large, 
however. this occurs at the cost of drastic-i.e., exponential- 
reduction in traffic volume (cf. Figure IV.4) which may render 
the attack ineffective with respect to achieving "denial of ser- 
vice." Attack volume may be recovered by mounting concur- 
rent, small volume attacks from a number of sites, but its effi- 
ciency needs to be evaluated with respect to the cost of mount- 
ing distributed attacks which grows with the number of hosts 
engaged in the attack. In particular, following the uncertainty 
optimization framework-minimization for the victim and max- 
imization for the attacker--of Section IV, given a desired at- 
tack volulne A;, an amplification factor of 4.1 can be trivially 
achieved by mounting fi/A,f-volume attacks from A 4  separate 
attack sites. That is, even in the absence of forging or spoof- 
ing of the marking field, the victim will need to process A4 total 
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Fig. V.I .  Left: The coefficient of expansion to the uncertainty amplification measured in the range -41 = 1 - 500. Right: The uncertainty factor 
m ( .\' ) 
.vm- (.\!/.V) 
m- (.ti) 
lneasured in rhe range .fld = 1 - 500. 
attack paths when fielding a defense, on-line or off-line. With 
spoofing of the marking field, amplification may be greater. In 
fact, it is given by the expression ~ ( m -  ( M / M ) / &  ( F ) )  where 
m- (.) is a function depicting the optimum (i.e.? minimax) un- 
certainty factor for the traffic volume given in the argument. 
Without spoofing, n1- (.W/AJ) = m- (-h i ) ,  and we arrive at the 
amplification factor M. With spoofing, m- ( - W / M )  > ni- (.K). 
B. Distributed DoS Attack Model 
B. 1 Classification 
The traceback probleni in distributed DoS attacks can be clas- 
sified into two categories in accordance with the objectives un- 
derlying the attack and its susceptibility to traceback. In an!;- 
source traceback, the attacker is assumed to be vulnerable to 
further traceback once a compromised attack host is identified 
(e.g., due to state information left on the host). Thus the attacker 
seeks to fortify the weakest link-i.e., maximize the uncertainty 
factor of each individual attack host-whereas the victim tries 
to find a weak attack host. In all-source traceback, we assume 
the attacker is able to mount stateless intrusions when gather- 
ing attack hosts, and thus his objective is to maximize total 
uncertainty (vs. individual uncertainty in the any-source trace- 
back case) since quick traceback of individual attack hosts does 
not present a danger with respect to revealing traceback infor- 
mation. The attacker's objective is to maximize the number of 
forged paths that the victim has to process, and the victim's goal 
is to isolate or shut down traffic flow emanating from comprised 
hosts. 
B.2 Traceback Analysis 
An environment for distributed DoS attack is described as fol- 
lows. Given M distinct sources, each source s i  sends IV; packets 
to victim t at di distance for 1  < i 5 Ad.  An attack path Ai is 
represented by Ai = (s i .  vi.1, vi.2. ... vi ,d ; .  t ) .  Without loss 
of generality, assume d i  < d j  for i < j. The expected number 
of spoofed packets received by the victim fro111 attack host s i is 
for 1  < i < A l .  The expected number of packets marked by 
, ~ ~ i : ~  is 
.77,i.l (l)) = Q i : ]  ( ~ ) - h ' ~  = p ( 1  - P ) d ' - l ! ~ i .  
An attack host niay use .AT,; to increase its uncertainty factor m7: 
or i t  Iiiay use its forged packets to help ainplify the uncertainty 
factor m-' of some other attack host j # i. That is: the attack 
hosts, in a distributed DoS attack, ]nay engage in cooperative 
actions to achieve a comnlon objective. 
In the case of any-source traceback: the objective of the at- 
tacker is to maximize 
whi6h is tantamount to fortifying the weakest attack host with 
respect to its uncertainty factor. Thus, (V. I) yields 
Q ~ : o ( P )  ~ n i n  {-} = mill { ( 1  - 1 = - - I .  
l< i<nl  ai.1 ( p )  l < i < . ~  p ( 1  - 1 : 
Thus, the any-source traceback case reduces to the single-source 
traceback problem as affected by the definition. 
In the case of all-source traceback, the objective of the at- 
tacker lies in maximizing 
To affect an increase in m: an attack host may send spoofed 
packets whose aim is to amplify another attack host's uncer- 
tainty factor rather than its own. The objective function can be 
further simplified 
n.r 
i= 1 i= 1 
p ( l  - p)" -' 
due to its lack of dependence on -Wi and d i .  Thus the derivation 
shows that from the attacker's point-of-view, one way of maxi- 
mizing m = c::, mi is to perform Ad separate maximizations 
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on each attack host. As with the any-source traceback case. all- 
source traceback reduces to the single-source traceback problem 
and does not necessitate cooperation among the attack hosts to 
achieve n1axlmun1 uncertainty amplification. When performing 
the constrained minimax optimization (111.7) on each attack host 
as given by the single-source formulation in Section 111. d l  and 
!Vi only enter in the 41  constraints corresponding to (111.6). 
C. Nutlier-icol E v o I ~ ~ a t i o t ~  f T r o c e b o c k  
To measure the (in)effectiveness of traceback in a distributed 
DoS attack setting: we perform comparative evaluation with 
single-source attack where the total traffic volume is held con- 
stant. As discussed in Section V-A, our aim lies in evaluating 
the degree to which distributed DoS attack under probabilistic 
packet marking can achieve uncertainty amplification above and 
beyond the distribution factor Ad achievable in the trivial case. 
Let I\; be the total attack traffic volume-the same for single- 
source attack as well as distributed DoS attack-and let -4:; = 
-V/Al. d,  = d. 1 < i < -&I, which facilitates comparability. 
Let 111,- (A;,) be the uncertainty factor achievable by A;,. Then 
the ratio 7 , -  (ll;/lll)/,~l; (.W) represents the expansion rate to un- 
certainty factor with respect to the distribution factor ill. Fig- 
ure V.1 (left) shows the coefficient of expansion to uncertainty 
amplification in an Ad-distributed attack where 1LI = 1 -- 500. 
As A I  increases: the coefficient of expansion increases: and 
achieves higher gains with sniall -V and small d. This inlplies 
that traceback to a single source becomes more difficult as the 
attack volume is scattered into smaller units. 
Figure V I  (right) shows the amplitication factor " % ' ~ ~ ' '  
as a function of A d .  The larger hl: the higher the amplification. 
Thus: given an attack volume, as attack sources are distributed, 
the uncertainty injected into traceback can be amplified beyond 
the effect afforded by clistribution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recently probabilistic packet marking has been proposed for 
tracing the source-i.e.. origin-f an DoS attack. While PPM 
has the advantages of efficiency and implelnentability over de- 
terministic packet marking and router based logging/messaging, 
it has the potential drawback that an attacker may impede trace- 
back by sending packets with spoofed marking field values as 
well as spoofed source 1P addresses. This paper analyzed the ef- 
fectiveness of PPM in a minimax adversarial context where the 
attacker is allowed to spoof the marking field to achieve maxi- 
mum confusion at the victim. Our analysis shows that, while it 
is always possible for an attacker to impede exact traceback by 
the victim. the attacker's ability to affect uncertainty is limited 
in internetworks with bounded diameters similar to the Internet. 
when a suitable marking probability is chosen. Thus, for single- 
source attacks PPM is effective at localizing the attack origin. 
In a distributed DoS attack, however, as the number of attack 
sources mounted increases, traceback is rendered more difficult 
due to an uncertainty amplification effect above and beyond the 
distribution factor A l .  
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